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THE SUBMISSION OF SPECIAL VERDICTS IN
NEGLIGENCE CASES-A CRITIQUE OF
THE BUG BITE CASE
LEON GREEN**
Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R.' reflects anew the difficulties of the
special verdict2 or special issue practice' in negligence cases. The power
to formulate issues adequately is a fine art possessed by few practitioners.
The inability to formulate the basic issues of a case, the fragmentation
of the issues by a multitude of questions which fail to present an issue,
and the frequent apparent or actual conflicts in the answers given by the
jury to such questions, render the special verdict practice exceedingly
treacherous. All of these vices are present in the case under study and
created great difficulties for the appellate courts. The case was finally re-
solved by a divided Supreme Court after a serious and puzzling exercise in
"exegesis" 4 on the part of the judges.
The factual situation giving rise to the litigation is not complicated.5
The plaintiff was the foreman of a switching crew engaged in spotting
cars on the defendant's tracks in an industrial area of Cleveland. The
track ran near a river and under bridges. A ditch along the right-of-way
and near the track was filled with stagnant water infested with vermin,
dead rats and pigeons. The condition of the ditch was known by the
defendant to have existed for a long time. While the plaintiff was
standing near the track under a bridge waiting for a switch engine, a
bug some two inches long and one-half inch wide bit his leg under his
trousers just above the knee. He crushed the bug beneath his trousers
* Except for the article by Professor Leon Green, all other articles in this symposium
were written by members of the University of Miami Law Review under Professor Green's
supervision.
** Professor, University of Texas Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Miami
Law School-1963.
1. 83 Sup. Ct. 659 (1963).
2. OHIo REV. CODE § 2315.15. The statutory special verdict is quite different from the
common law special verdict, and is also to be distinguished from the special interrogatory
practice employed to test a general verdict. The statutory special verdict based on modern
English practice normally requires the submission of ultimate issues but not evidentiary
issues which are merely in support of the ultimate issues.
3. See HODGES, SPECIAL IssuE SuBmISSION IN TEXAS (1959) for detailed treatment of
the highly complex Texas special issue practice.
4. "We therefore must attempt to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis if necessary
...before we are free to disregard the jury's special verdict . . . ." Supra note 1 at 666.
5. For a more complete statement of the case see the reports of the case in 173 N.E.2d
382 (Ohio Ct. App.) and 83 Sup. Ct. at 661.
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with his hand, heard it pop, and it fell out of the leg of his trousers on
the ground. At that instant he caught the passing engine and did not
examine the bug. When he went home he discovered that the bite was
a serious one. It did not yield to home treatment; the infection increased
and he consulted a doctor who administered penicillin. His condition
became worse, he consulted other doctors and other drugs were utilized
to no avail. Boils developed over his body and after several years of
treatment both legs had to be amputated. At the time of the trial the
loss of an arm seemed likely.
At trial he was awarded a judgment for 625,000 dollars. On appeal
to the Ohio Court of Appeals the judgment was reversed on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to raise the issue and support a finding
of causal relation between the defendant's conduct in permitting the
ditch of infested water on its right-of-way and the bug bite plaintiff
received while working near the ditch. The Ohio Supreme Court refused
further review. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
the judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals was reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion here
under review.
The basic issues involved are the usual issues found in a negligence
case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act:
(1) Did the conduct of the defendant in permitting the ditch of
stagnant water infested by vermin on its right-of-way where the plaintiff
was working contribute to the injury? That the plaintiff was bitten by
a bug and as a result suffered the frightful impairment of his body that
followed was supported by the evidence and so found by the jury.'
Whether the bug was causally related to the vermin-infested ditch of
water was more questionable but, as was found by the jury and held by
the Supreme Court, the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that this causal relation did in fact exist. Instead of the causal
relation issue being submitted pointedly in a single inquiry, it was sub-
mitted in four parts as indicated by questions 10, 18, 19 and 21 set out in
the margin.' The fact that there were competing and conflicting reason-
able inferences that might have been drawn did not require that the issue
be withdrawn from the jury. The choice of inferences was the function
of the jury.
6. "10. On approximately August 10, 1954, was plaintiff bitten by an insect? Yes." 83
Sup. Ct. at 661.
7. Id. note 6 supra. "18. Was the illness or disease from which Mr. Gallick now suffers
caused in whole or in part by an insect bite sustained by him on defendant B. & O.'s
premises? Yes.
"19. Were the injuries to the plaintiff proximately caused . . . by . . . the acts or
omissions of the defendant? Yes . . ..
"21. Was there a proximate causal relationship to the stagnant water, the dead
rats, the dead pigeons, the insect bite and the present physical condition of the plaintiff?
Yes." Id. at 662.
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In this connection it may be noted that the court throughout the
opinion speaks of causal relation between the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiff's injury. While this professional habit is widespread
it is not well founded and may be quite harmful to clear analysis. It
is not harmful so long as it is understood that the relation is between
conduct and injury. Whether the conduct is negligent is another issue
determinable by different considerations.'
(2) Did the defendant owe the plaintiff a duty with respect to the
risk of being bitten by a bug harbored by the ditch of stagnant water?
This was a question of law for the court. The jury had no part to play
in its determination. Whether the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff with respect to the danger of being bitten by a poisonous bug
included that risk was an issue of policy, not one of fact.9 There was
slight discussion of this problem. Apparently the defendant's duty was
assumed once it was shown that the plaintiff's injury was the result of the
defendant's conduct in permitting the vermin-infested ditch to exist
so near its track.
(3) Did the defendant violate its duty to the plaintiff, that is, was
the defendant negligent in maintaining the stagnant ditch infested with
vermin near its track with respect to the bug bite suffered by the plaintiff?
If the plaintiff's allegations were supported by sufficient evidence, whether
the defendant was negligent with respect to the bug bite suffered by the
plaintiff was an issue for the jury. As reflected by the Supreme Court
opinion, no question of the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue
was raised, and under the facts given, its submission to the jury was
required.
This issue, however, was not clearly submitted to the jury by any
one of the questions reflected in the reports of the case. Questions 14,
15, 16, 17, 20 and 22 make stabs at the issue,"0 but neither separately
8. Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 56 (1898): "Until you know what did occasion an
injury, you cannot say that defendant was guilty of some negligence that produced the
injury." On necessity of showing that defendant's conduct contributed to a victim's injury
before the negligence issue arises see Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 331 P.2d 111, 116 (Cal.
App. 1958); Manley v. New York Tel. Co., 303 N.Y. 18, 100 N.E.2d 113 (1951) with
which compare companion case, Seeley v. New York Tel. Co., 281 App. Div. 285, 120
N.Y.S.2d 262 (1953). See also full discussion, Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negli-
gence Cases, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 543, 548 et seq. (1962).
9. The issue of "duty" only raises the problem whether there is any law to support
the plaintiff's case. Usually it is so clear that no point is made of it. But the risk of injury
may be such that it falls without any principle of law on which the case is rested. For
full discussion see Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 T=As L. REV. 42 (1962).
10. "14. [D]id the defendant B. & 0. know that by permitting the accumulation of
said pool of stagnant water, dead pigeons, dead rats, bugs and vermin would be attracted
to this area? Yes.
"15. If the answer to 14 is yes, did the defendant B. & 0. know that its employees
would have to work in this area? Yes.
"16. Was the defendant negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged in the
petition? Yes.
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nor together do they adequately state the issue. The instructions of
the trial court in connection with the several questions submitted, as set
forth in the footnotes of the Supreme Court opinion," do little to clarify
the issue and fall far short of informing the jury what it was to decide
and by what standards. At best, both the questions, fragmented as they
were, and the less-than-accurate instructions, were confusing.
The negligence of the defendant was a single issue, the heart of
the case, which should have been submitted with proper instructions.
The Ohio Court of Appeals did not consider any of the points of error
directed at the submission of the issue, but reversed the judgment of
the trial court on the insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
causal relation. Nevertheless, the negligence issue got before the Supreme
Court on the basis of the contention of the defendant that the judgment
of the Court of Appeals could be supported and based on the finding
of the jury that "the injury was not reasonably foreseeable and therefore
there was no negligence."' 2 This alternative ground was sought to be
supported by a fatal inconsistency between the jury's negative answers
to questions 20 and 22 and the affirmative answers to other questions.' 3
The majority of the court responded to the defendant's challenge in this
respect and concluded that there was no inconsistency in the answers.
The dissenting judges made strong arguments supporting the contention of
inconsistency, but it is believed that questions 20 and 22 are impertinent
with respect to the negligence issue, as will be indicated below. The
majority, as has often been done in poorly tried cases, pieced together
the scraps of findings by the jury as supported by the evidence and
presented a rational basis for holding that the trial judgment was based
on defendant's negligent conduct. 14 As opposed to any inconsistency
of the findings based on impertinent questions, this affirmative showing
of liability as developed by the court seems well founded.
"17. If the answer to Question 16 is yes, indicate in the words of the petition the
acts or omissions which constitute defendant's negligence. (Answer:) There existed a pool
of stagnant water on premises in the possession of and under the control of defendant into
which was accumulated dead pigeons, rats and various forms of bugs and vermin ...
"20. [Was there any reason for the defendant B. & 0. to anticipate that such
(maintaining stagnant, infested pool) would or might probably result in a mishap or
injury? No ....
"22. If the answer to Question 21 is yes, was it within the realm of reasonable
probability or forseeability of the defendant B. & 0. to appreciate this proximate causal
relationship between the stagnant water, the dead rats, the dead pigeons, the insect bite
and the present physical condition of the plaintiff ? No." 83 Sup. Ct. at 662.
Question 21 is set out in note 7 supra.
11. 83 Sup. Ct. at 665-67, notes 6, 7 and 9; id. at 669, notes 1, 2 (dissenting opinion).
12. "Respondent makes the further argument that the judgment under review may be
sustained on the alternative ground, not accepted by the Court of Appeals, that the injury
was not reasonably foreseeable, and that therefore there was no negligence." 83 Sup. Ct. at
665.
13. Supra note 10.
14. 83 Sup. Ct. at 665-66 (summarizing statement).
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The negligence issue and the formula for its determination are most
comprehensive and give a jury great power in the determination of a
negligence case. As was agreed by all the judges, the issue is measured
by the foreseeability of danger and the failure to exercise reasonable
care to avoid injury that may result from the danger. It is only in the
light of foreseeable danger that negligent conduct has meaning. Both
phases of the formula must be found favorably to the plaintiff as a basis
of recovery of damages. Moreover, the issue must be determined with
respect to the conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by the
victim. Conduct must be brought in focus with injury. As normally
phrased the formula inquires: Should the defendant, as an ordinarily
prudent person, under all the circumstances surrounding the particular
situation, have reasonably foreseen as a result of his conduct, some such
injury as was suffered by the victim, or any one else so situated, and
did the defendant fail to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent person
to avoid this injury?
It will be noted that the specific hurt does not have to be foreseen,
nor do its consequences have to be foreseen.'" Nor does the injury have
to be probable. It need only be the result of the absence of reasonable
care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised to avoid
it. In most negligence cases the possibility of injury is one which
requires reasonable care to avoid it.'"
In this connection it will be noted that questions 20 and 2211
place the emphasis on the defendant railroad and not on what a reason-
ably prudent person should have foreseen. Also, both questions require
probability of injury to the plaintiff, when the risk of injury need only
be that which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised reason-
able care to avoid. It will be further noted that question 22, tied as it
is to question 2 1,18 inquires of the jury: " [W]as it within the realm of rea-
sonable probability or foreseeability of the defendant B. & 0. to appreciate
this proximate causal relationship between the stagnant water, the dead
15. The authorities cited by the court, 83 Sup. Ct. at 667, adequately support this
point.
16. See Santos v. Unity Hospital, 301 N.Y. 153, 93 N.E.2d 574 (1950). Due to a rare
mental derangement, patient jumped out of hospital window during childbirth; one case in
300,000; no other case in 25,000 births at defendant's hospital. Nurse had turned to answer
phone fifteen feet away, negligence not to have bars on window and in not providing
uninterrupted attendance of patient. See example in Tulgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82
N.H. 268, 133 Atl. 4 (1926). A motorist takes the inside of a sharp curve on a mountain
road where only three or four cars pass each day and it is highly improbable that the
motorist will meet another car coming around the curve. But he does and a collision
occurs. Would a reasonable person in the exercise of ordinary care have taken the risk?
Nine times out of ten when a motorist violates some rule of the road no injury to anyone
results. But it is the unexpected that usually happens, there is always the possibility that
someone will be hurt, and that is enough in most cases to impose liability.
17. Note 10 supra.
18. Note 7 supra.
1963]
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rats, the dead pigeons, the insect bite and the present physical condition of
the plaintiff?"19 There is no rule of law anywhere that would require
this type of finding nor would this type of finding be pertinent. Fore-
seeability is not directed at "proximate causal relationship," nor at the
"present physical condition of the plaintiff," and neither is relevant to
the determination of the negligence issue. Danger of injury at the time
of its occurrence, and not its consequences at the time of the trial, is all
that is required to be within the range of the foreseeability of a defendant
as a reasonably prudent person. It need only be added that the weight
put on the imponderable concepts of foreseeability,2 ° probability and
proximate, in all their numerous combinations, is more than the litigation
process in negligence cases can successfully sustain.2 ' Some adequate
method of submitting the issues of a negligence case within the range
of general professional understanding has been too long delayed.22
19. 83 Sup. Ct. at 662.
20. See Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLum. L. REv. 1401 (1961) for
a fuller discussion.
21. Justice Harlan in his dissent, 83 Sup. Ct. 668 makes a significant statement: "It
[this case] affords a particularly dramatic example of the inadequacy of ordinary negli-
gence law to meet the social obligations of modern industrial society. The cure for that,
however, lies with the legislature and not the courts." His indictment seems fully justified,
but it is doubtful that legislatures can or will give an adequate remedy. The courts them-
selves can relieve the situation to a great extent by simply refusing to carry forward
much of the metaphysical nonsense that characterizes nineteenth century negligence law
such as much of that found in Vol. II, chapters 12 and 16 of the Restatement of Torts.
The Supreme Court's work in protecting the integrity of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act has been due in large part to the attempts of state and lower federal courts to read back
into the Act much of obsolescent negligence law that Congress had read out of it. The
case under review is a good example of how a relatively simple case can be subjected to
highly questionable litigation procedures.
22. The damage issue of the case under review was not reached by the Ohio Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. The verdict is a large one and while the disposition of the
case by the Supreme Court may preclude denial of liability, presumably the Ohio court
may reduce the damages unless the federal constitutional provision for jury trial prevents
a state appellate court from requiring a remittitur. This apparently is a point still
unsettled-a sort of Achilles heel of F.E.L.A., especially if state appellate courts can reduce
the amount of damages for which judgment is given by a trial court.
